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The role of agriculture in development and poverty alleviation, including that of 
agricultural research, has been reevaluated in recent years (World Bank 2007). The discussion, 
however, has not yet fully addressed how globalization, migration and new technologies have 
changed the dynamics of poverty and the organization of science, and what role formal research, 
including the CGIAR, should play in the new juncture. 
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is an informal 
alliance of about 60 international donors (including governments from developed and developing 
countries, private foundations and multilateral organizations) that support 15 international 
agricultural research centers. The first two centers in the system (CIMMYT and IRRI) created 
the high yielding varieties that were a key factor in the Green Revolution. 
Poverty alleviation has two benchmarks: achieving food security and affording a healthy 
life. In the past, greater productivity of food crops resulting from input-intensive technologies 
was seen as the main tool to achieve both goals; this view was supported by the success of the 
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Green Revolution in Asia. This is no longer the case. An increasing share of rural households 
derive most of their income from off-farm employment (World Bank 2007); for them food 
security depends more on access to labor markets and on the price of staples than on their own 
food production. For those households that still rely mostly on staple production, food security 
still depends on higher yields, but for most of them, it will not be the path out of poverty (see 
section 2). On the other hand, higher yields can eliminate poverty for those small farmers who 
can make the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture. Recent studies seem to 
indicate, however, that only a small share of rural households can make this transition (Ekboir et 
al. 2008).  
The substantial reduction in poverty observed in the last two decades resulted from rapid 
growth enabled by integration into globalized markets and from remittances from migrants and 
not from the expansion of staples in small farms (World Bank 2005; IFAD 2008). Commercial 
agriculture played an important role in this process. Its expansion resulted from the use of 
commercial and production technologies generated by private firms and sometimes by NGOs. 
International and public research institutions contributed little to the process. As the limited 
contribution of public research to agricultural development became evident, donors started to 
question the effectiveness of their contributions to agricultural research, including the CGIAR 
and developing countries’ research institutions (Byerlee, Alex and Echeverria 2002). 
The questions about the CGIAR’s effectiveness also reflected a better understanding of the 
links between formal research and innovation. The literature on innovation processes and the 
theories of complexity have shown the limitations of the linear vision of science, and have 
identified new instruments to foster economic and social development. For several reasons, 
however, the CGIAR has not been successful enough in adapting to the new environment. First, 
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in contrast to what happened fifty years ago, there is no clear model of what role modern 
technologies should play in development, in particular, because there are no clear recipes for 
development (Rodrik 2006). Second, it has been accepted that the joint dynamics of agriculture 
and poverty have changed (see section 2), but it is not clear what role the CGIAR should play in 
poverty alleviation. Third, because the CGIAR is composed of a large number of actors, each 
with his/her own agenda, it is difficult to agree on and implement substantial changes in a system 
with diffuse governance mechanisms. Fourth, the CGIAR’s existence was justified as a source of 
international public goods. When the linear model of science was shown to be incorrect, the idea 
of scientific public goods as a source of economic growth was also questioned (see section 3.3). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the new dynamics 
of agriculture, especially the impacts of globalization, high value markets and remittances. 
Section 3 examines some recent advances in the literature of innovation systems and complexity 
theories, while section 4 presents a stylized picture of changes in research systems. Section 5 
discusses the CGIAR’s current role and section 6 presents some ideas to adapt the system to the 
needs of twenty first century agriculture.  
2. The new dynamics of agriculture and rural poverty 
Globalization, technical change and migration have substantially transformed the joint 
dynamics of agriculture and poverty in developing countries. Prior to the 1980s, poverty was 
closely linked to agriculture. Since most countries were in the initial stages of urbanization and 
travel was difficult, farming families worked mostly in rural areas and derived most of their 
income and food from agriculture. It was only natural to expect that poverty alleviation and 
growth in agricultural-based countries would come from increased agricultural productivity (see, 
for example, World Bank 2007), which was concentrated in staples and a few export products.  
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Agricultural development programs were based on the assumption that productivity jumps 
could only come from “modern” technologies, designed by scientists and “transferred” by 
extension agents (World Bank 2006). In this framework, the greatest limitation to agricultural 
growth was insufficient access by farmers to technical information. Important investments were 
made in research and extension services, that specialized in a few grains, livestock and 
sometimes dairy (Byerlee, Alex and Echeverria 2002). The success of the Green Revolution in 
South Asia was seen as confirmation of this model. It was not recognized until recently that the 
impacts of the Green Revolution could not be attributed only to science but to a package that 
included major investments in infrastructure and subsidized inputs and outputs (Morris and 
Byerlee 1998).  
After the crisis of the 1980s, most developing countries implemented structural adjustment 
programs, which included market liberalization, downsizing the public sector and opening new 
activities to the private sector (Staatz and Eicher 1998). Helped by the new institutional 
environment, multilateral trade agreements and novel technologies, agriculture in Latin America 
and Asia grew rapidly. Expansion of smallholder commercial agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa 
started in the 1990s. In 2004, exports of high value agricultural products accounted for 43% of 
agrifood exports from developing countries (World Bank 2007). 
Prior to the 1980s market imperfections, insufficient infrastructure and economies of scale 
limited small farmers’ access to input and output markets (Staatz and Eicher 1998). With 
deregulation, domestic and international markets became more integrated, diversified and 
sophisticated, which opened new opportunities and created new challenges for farmers in 
developing countries.  
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Technical change in production, post-harvest, transportation and marketing enabled the 
expansion of agricultural markets and the emergence of high value agriculture. Most 
technologies for high-value products were imported and adapted to local conditions by private 
firms or NGOs (Reardon 2005) Multinational companies sold worldwide the products they 
developed in their central laboratories, allowing commercial farmers access to the latest inputs. 
The public research and extension institutes from developing countries, in general, did not 
participate in the expansion of the most dynamic markets, but some researchers participated as 
individuals (Ekboir et al. 2008). Although the public research institutes continued to work mostly 
in their traditional lines of research, some opened programs in high-value products. Many 
CGIAR researchers participated in international networks that developed important technological 
packages for traditional products (see, for example, Ekboir 2002 and Gabre-Madhin and 
Haggblade 2004). In other cases, they were instrumental in the development of niche markets 
(e.g., Papa Andina). Their contribution to poverty alleviation, however, seems to have been 
limited because few small farmers have been able to escape poverty producing cereals, or 
because niche markets by nature cannot be massive (see below). The limited participation of the 
CGIAR and public research institutions in the most dynamic agricultural markets led many 
stakeholders to question their role in poverty alleviation. 
Local markets for traditional agricultural products also became integrated into international 
markets through imports. Small farmers suddenly had to compete with foreign farmers, even if 
they continued doing what they had been doing for generations. The external competition 
reduced the profitability of traditional products, especially for small farmers who did not 
introduce more intensive technologies. Contrary to what was expected, many small farmers 
continued producing traditional products despite the strong competition from imports. The most 
Paper presented in the VI Globelics Conference, September 22-24 2008, Mexico City 
6 
 
accepted explanation for this phenomenon is that poor rural families derive only a small 
percentage of their income from agriculture, with off-farm employment and remittances being 
the main sources of earnings (Taylor, Dyer and Yunez-Naude 2005). These families still live in 
the land, but farm only to secure their supply of staples or to produce specialty products that 
cannot be easily bought and are needed for traditional foods. Thus, the price elasticity of their 
production is very low. Higher productivity is still important for the poorest of the poor who 
have limited insertion in labor markets. For these households, higher yields reduce food 
insecurity although it is highly unlikely that they will lift them out of poverty.3  
Local and distant labor markets also became more integrated. Easier travel and improved 
financial services meant that people from rural areas could work in distant locations and send 
remittances back home. The livelihood strategies of most poor rural households are now more 
diversified, with non-farm income increasing faster than farm income (World Bank 2005; 
Holden, Shiferaw and Pender 2004). In fact, there is mounting evidence that for many rural 
households increasing agricultural productivity has become less relevant than expanding other 
sources of income (World Bank 2007; Barrett, Reardon and Webb 2001; Davis et al. 2000).  
In fact, domestic and international migration is becoming the cornerstone of the livelihood 
strategies of many rural households (Vargas-Lundius 2004). It is estimated that in 2006, 150 
million international migrants sent home US$300 billion (IFAD 2008). It has been consistently 
found that remittances reduce poverty (Özden and Schiff 2006; López-Córdova and Olmedo 
                                               
3 For example, maize produced under rainfed conditions with a good technology for small farmers can yield about 7 
ton/ha. At the price of 450 dollars per ton, it would generate a revenue of $3150 per ha. After deducting all costs, the 
net income would still not be enough to lift the household out of poverty. 
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2006), and that most remittances are invested in education and health (i.e., in human capital that 
can be used in off-farm employment), housing and only a small proportion in expanding 
agricultural production (López-Córdova and Olmedo 2006; Davis et al. 2000). The reasons for 
these investment preferences are poorly understood but they are an indication of the limitations 
of traditional development policies (including agricultural research and extension) aimed at 
increasing the agricultural output of most poor rural households.  
It has also been found that the most effective way to reduce poverty is through economic 
growth (World Bank 2005). In other words, programs to increase agricultural productivity 
among poor farmers have a smaller effect on poverty than support to rapidly expanding markets 
combined with programs to facilitate integration of poor households into markets, either as 
producers of high value products or as specialized workers.  
This rapid review shows that many of the assumptions that justified the creation of the 
CGIAR are no longer valid. The changes in the global economy and in technologies had major 
consequences for the global research system, especially for the perception of the role agricultural 
research should play in poverty alleviation. The global surplus of cereals and the expansion of 
global food markets until recently showed that hunger was not caused by insufficient production 
but by the poor’s inability to buy food, and that food security was not equivalent to food self-
sufficiency (both at the national level and the level of the poor households). It also became 
apparent that small farmers would not escape poverty by producing staples in small plots, but by 
integrating into high value markets or by working off- farm.4 In some cases higher productivity 
of staples triggered a virtuous cycle; because poor rural households needed to allocate fewer 
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resources to food production, they could start new income generating activities (Ekboir, Boa and 
Dankyi 2002). But these households were better off only if they diversified out of staples. 
3. The nature of innovation processes 
Innovation depends both on motivation and ability (Christensen, Anthony and Roth 2004). 
Globalization, technical change and better infrastructure create opportunities when they link rural 
agents (including farmers) to markets. But to take advantage of these opportunities, these agents 
have to develop appropriate capabilities. This section reviews the complex nature of innovation 
and of innovative capabilities.  
3.1 What is a complex process? 
Traditionally, researchers and policy-makers thought of natural and social processes as 
mechanisms that could be controlled by pulling the appropriate levers; this vision has been 
challenged by complexity theories that posit that these processes behave more like living 
organisms that can be influenced but not controlled (Crutchfield and Schuster 2003). The most 
relevant type of complex systems for the analysis of the CGIAR is formed by many different 
independent decision-makers (for example, directors, managers, employees, clients and 
suppliers), multiple interactions, many feedback mechanisms and random processes. Such 
systems are known as complex adaptive systems (CAS) (Kauffman 1995).  
Because of its decentralized nature, no single agent can manipulate a CAS or predict how it 
will evolve; therefore, new approaches are needed for planning and policy-making. There are 
several methods to do this and discussing them exceeds the scope of this paper (for a detailed 
discussion see Axelrod and Cohen 1999 and Crutchfield and Schuster 2003). One way to 
influence a CAS is to operate on the dynamics of evolution, especially variation and selection. 
For example, a plant breeder knows the characteristics of the parents available to her and selects 
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those she hopes will pass some desired trait to their progeny (e.g. resistance to a given disease). 
In the early stages of developing a new variety, the breeder usually makes thousands of non-
naturally occurring crosses. In other words, the breeder increases variety by making crosses she 
hopes will raise the probability of obtaining the desired result (as opposed to the totally random 
crosses that occur in nature). With artificial selection, the breeder overrides the natural process 
of selection via reproductive efficiency by selecting the progeny that displays the desired 
properties without taking into account their reproductive efficiency.  
The latter example illustrates a key characteristic of operating on a CAS: contrary to what 
an engineer (or a researcher working with traditional methods) would do, the “solutions” to 
“problems” are obtained through a process of directed search without designing them 
intentionally. On the other hand, scientists who use a rational design approach start by building a 
detailed model of the problem, and then design a structure that can serve as a solution. The 
relative efficiency of each method depends on the complexity and stability of the processes upon 
which it operates and how much is known about them. If little is known, if it changes rapidly or 
is complex, rational design is less effective because it limits the exploration of the solution space 
and bets that the explored solution is the most effective. In these cases, the effectiveness of the 
rational design approach depends more on luck than the management of variety and selection 
approach. It has been demonstrated that the latter converges on an optimum at least as quickly as 
the rational design method (Crutchfield and Schuster 2003).  
3.2 What do we know about innovation? 
We define an innovation as anything new successfully introduced into an economic or 
social process. Major innovations combine a business model and a technological package 
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(Davila, Epstein and Shelton 2006). Innovations that do not include both components result in 
minor improvements along an established technological trajectory.  
A consequence of our definition is that researchers do not generate innovations but 
information, either codified (e.g., a paper or blueprint), embedded (e.g., an improved seed) or 
tacit. This information only becomes an innovation when an agent uses it to improve what s/he is 
doing. Innovators use different sources of information; most of it, however, does not originate in 
science but in everyday activities and in interactions with other actors (Faberger 2005). Thus, 
innovative capabilities depend on the agents’ absorptive capabilities, i.e., on the agent’s ability to 
use existing information (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Rapid adoption of new technologies is not 
necessarily associated with large expenditures on research and extension, but with the 
development of absorptive capabilities (Ekboir et al. 2008). For this reason, the dynamics of 
innovation systems do not depend on the agents at the forefront of research and technology 
development, but on the innovative capabilities of the majority of agents. In other words, it is 
more important to have many agents searching for and adapting existing technologies than to 
have a few sophisticated research institutes in a static society.  
Because of the exploding volume of information and the increasing complexity of 
innovations, no agent commands all the resources needed to innovate; therefore, innovators 
integrate into networks (Powell and Grodal 2005). The dynamics of innovation networks depend 
on their complexity and maturity. For simple innovations or mature markets, the networks are 
loose and members interact mostly formally or through markets because each actor understands 
the needs of other actors. These networks have been the model for most agricultural programs, 
including the CGIAR. On the other hand, in the case of new or complex innovations, members 
interact often and informally to overcome unforeseen obstacles and to build confidence. The 
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need for intense interactions arises because generalized uncertainty about the new technologies 
and their market potential prevents effective contracting (Christensen, Anthony and Roth 2004).  
The effectiveness of innovation networks depends on their ability to facilitate the exchange 
of information and resources. Technically, this is known as the network’s navigability. 
Navigability depends on the existence of “central” actors (e.g., very connected actors) interacting 
among them. It has been shown that a few central actors can increase the network’s navigability 
tremendously (Watts 1999).  
The emergence and consolidation of innovation networks depends on a number of factors, 
among which a catalyzing agent is one of the most important (Ekboir 2002). This agent induces 
other partners to invest time and resources in the network. Once the network is consolidated, the 
importance of the catalyzing agents diminishes, because other actors are more willing to 
participate when the benefits of participation become clearer, and the interaction rules are known 
to all partners. The role of the catalyzing agent is different from that of linking agents. The 
catalyzing agent facilitates the emergence of the network while the linking agent increases the 
connectivity, even in mature networks. While the catalyzing agent is essential in the early life of 
a network, the linking agents are important through the whole process. The CGIAR can play 
important roles in the emergence and consolidation of innovation networks. 
3.3 The nature of organizational innovative capabilities 
Organizational capabilities are important because actors seldom innovate in isolation, but 
rather interacting in formal or informal networks. These capabilities cannot be bought or easily 
copied; thus, they have to be built with sustained investments, selection of appropriate specialists 
and project leaders, and strong commitment among the partners (Christensen and Raynor 2003). 
Organizational capabilities are embedded in individuals and in the organization’s technology, 
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structure, strategies, routines, culture and coordination procedures (Argote and Darr 2000). Even 
though innovative organizations must have at least a few innovative individuals, this is not 
required for the vast majority of its members; what is required is that the organizations create an 
environment in which innovative individuals can express their abilities and influence other 
members (Christensen and Raynor 2003). 
Organizations depend on their innovative capabilities to respond to changes in the 
technological, economic and social environments. Innovative capabilities are built by learning, 
i.e., by creating knowledge. The specialized literature differentiates between information and 
knowledge (Quantas 2000). Information is raw data (e.g., published materials, blueprints or 
physical objects), while knowledge is the use of the data to create unique interpretations of 
reality. Because of its personal nature, two actors can learn different things from the same 
information, or the same thing from different types of information. Knowledge is very difficult to 
share while information can be disseminated quite easily.  
Because the information stock is complex, diverse, short-lived and fast-growing, learning 
requires strong capabilities to search for useful information and digest it to create knowledge 
(Ekboir et al. 2008). These absorptive capabilities depend on exogenous and endogenous factors. 
Economic stability, development, the nature of competition and the interactions between firms 
and research institutes are important exogenous factors; the endogenous factors include 
organizational cultures, investments made in the search for and adaptation of information, quality 
of the personnel and mechanisms to socialize knowledge. 
The understanding of organizational innovative capabilities has major consequences for the 
nature and role of the CGIAR. One of the major justifications for its existence has been the 
generation of international public goods (Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006; CGIAR 2006). The 
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public goods generated by the CGIAR are technical information, either embodied such as seeds, 
or disembodied as publications and agronomic recommendations.5 Pure public goods do not 
require any special effort or skill on the side of the receiver of the services of the goods. But to 
use technical information, innovators have to invest substantial resources to develop absorptive 
capabilities. In other words, while information may be free, its use is not (Faberger 2005); 
spillovers only occur when agents have invested in their absorptive capabilities.  
4. Changes in the organization of science 
Globalization, new regulations and advanced technologies are redefining the international 
research environment. Increasing interdependence between knowledge-based economies implies 
an ever-expanding international flow of technology, scientific knowledge and know-how. The 
better understanding of complex systems and the development of methods to operate on them are 
also changing the organization of science in four ways. First, the linear vision of science 
highlighted the preeminence of theoretical research over applied work. The examples presented 
in section 3.1show that in fact, both approaches are complementary. Even more, overreliance on 
theoretical work in a CAS can actually be a hindrance, because it constraints the exploration of 
new research approaches and potential solutions.  
                                               
5 It must be noticed, though, that a seed is not a public good since it is rival and excludable. The fact that 
CGAR centers have distributed seeds for free does not change their private good nature. The public good is how to 
combine parents to develop a particular seed. A similar confusion has been made regarding the public good nature of 
international germplasm banks. Although these banks serve the whole humanity, they could in principle refuse to 
give seeds to a particular institution and, since the use of a seed precludes others from using exactly that same seed, 
they are rival. 
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Second, research systems must be flexible to react to new problems and research 
opportunities. But individual institutions cannot react fast enough because of inertias 
(Christensen, Anthony and Roth 2004). Flexibility can only be achieved with enough variation in 
the system. In other words, it is necessary to have a system with many good institutions that can 
form inter-institutional teams to solve emerging problems; in fact, this has been one of the major 
strengths of the American research system (Kraemer 2006), and one of the major problems the 
CGIAR faces (see section 5). Third, effective research systems resulted when researchers 
interacted closely with innovative agents (Dosi, Llerena and Sylos Labini 2006), but the CGIAR 
has had problems in identifying new partners beyond the National Agricultural Research 
Institutes (NARIs). 
Fourth, formal research has traditionally been conducted by stable teams within an 
institution and discipline; Gibbons et al. (1994) called this organization the mode 1 of research. 
This mode describes the CGIAR in its early days, except that instead of just one institution, the 
centers coordinated breeding networks. In mode 2, teams are multidisciplinary, multi-
institutional (often involving researchers from the public and private sectors), increasingly 
distributed in distant locations and relatively ephemeral, as they are formed to respond to specific 
issues. This organization allows innovative agents and research institutions to react rapidly to 
emerging technological needs or opportunities. How to switch to mode 2 is the most important 
challenge the CGIAR faces today. 
5. A review of the CGIAR 
The original design of the CGIAR reflected the success of the Green Revolution, the fact 
that most of the poor lived off of agriculture (see section 2) and a linear vision of science. In its 
early years, the CGIAR had a very clear and narrow goal: to stave off hunger by increasing the 
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productivity of staples in small farms (Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006). Thus, it gave highest 
priority to breeding improved varieties of cereals. In the 1970s, about two-thirds of CGIAR 
resources were allocated to research on rice, wheat and maize. High priority was later given to 
improving the quality of diets through research on food legumes and ruminant livestock 
(Anderson 1998). The initial success of the CGIAR resulted from the collective effort of high 
quality researchers working on a narrowly focused problem (i.e., plant breeding) and 
policymakers providing the economic incentives to induce adoption (Morris and Byerlee 1998). 
In this sense, the CGIAR in its early days repeated the formula that made the US research system 
highly effective (Kraemer 2006) and was similar to other successful programs, such as 
SEMATECH.  
Following the linear vision, the first CGIAR centers were the central nodes of breeding 
networks that included the NARIs selecting locally adapted varieties, extension services taking 
the seeds to the farmers and sometimes policy makers providing the economic incentives to 
induce adoption. The limited impact of improved germplasm on poverty outside South Asia soon 
became apparent, and in 1971 the donors and centers expanded their activities under six broad 
program thrusts: research to increase productivity of food production; management of natural 
resources; assisting countries in designing and implementing food, agricultural and research 
policies; capacity building by training and strengthening national agricultural research systems 
(NARs); germplasm conservation by collecting and classifying genetic resources and 
maintaining genebanks and other means of conservation; and building linkages between NARs 
and other components of the international agricultural research system (Anderson 1998).  
The new activities were added with little consideration for what these changes meant for 
the type of science the CGIAR should conduct. Several factors reduced the effectiveness of the 
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expanded mandate. First, in contrast with the focused mission of the first years, the new 
objectives were more diffused and spread the resources over more activities. Second, breeding is 
essentially different from research in other agricultural fields. Breeding relied on networks that 
fostered international exchanges of germplasm; in other words, they increased diversity 
combined with an effective selection mechanism; in this way they helped to identify the most 
promising varieties. The other activities did not form similar global networks and worked with a 
smaller set of partners because their research was more location-specific, and no agreement 
emerged on what were the best methods to study those topics. Additionally, it was not clear what 
advantage international researchers had in more location-specific research (CGIAR 2006).  
Third, seeds of some commercial crops (e.g., maize and wheat) are probably the only 
embedded technologies where public and private agricultural researchers “compete”. Most other 
embedded technologies (e.g., agrochemicals and machinery) are generated by private firms, 
while public research develops disembodied technologies, i.e., information that farmers have to 
“absorb” to improve their productive packages. In the 1990s donors started to question the 
effectiveness of agricultural research when it became clear that the CGIAR centers were not 
participating in the most dynamic agricultural markets (see section 2) and their impact on 
poverty was not evident. Initially, success of breeding programs was measured by the number of 
varieties released, while adoption was the benchmark for other agronomic research. When 
adoption also became a benchmark for breeding, many stakeholders started to question the 
system’s effectiveness. Fourth, while the centers could often find good partners for breeding in 
some NARIs, it was more difficult to find them in other research areas.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the conceptual model of research systems in developing countries 
underwent major changes. The concept of the NARIs was replaced by the NARS, which also 
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included universities and other agricultural research institutions; later the NARS was replaced by 
the AKIS which included research, education and extension (Byerlee, Alex and Echeverria 
2002). While these models still reflected the linear vision of science, they showed that the 
CGIAR had to develop new interactions with a more diverse set of partners, many of which had 
weak research capabilities (see, for example, Spielman et al. 2008).  
Several stakeholders criticized the NARS for their lack of participation in the emergence of 
high-value markets and the failure of modern varieties to eradicate poverty. This led to a 
substantial downsizing or closure of public research and extension institutions (Byerlee, Alex 
and Echeverria 2002). The CGIAR centers found that they could no longer rely exclusively on 
weakened traditional partners, and started to work with private firms and NGOs. But these 
interactions were in general more local than crop improvement. 
In these years, the CGIAR’s mandate expanded even more. The new activities included 
managing research networks to facilitate research performed by others, some in conjunction with 
CGIAR centers (Plucknett, Smith, and Özgediz 1990); rehabilitating seed stocks in nature- or 
war-ravaged countries; promoting no-till, and developing niche markets. Because the expanded 
mandate had to be met with reduced budgets, breeding programs were further scaled back 
(Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006). The expansion in the number and types of potential partners 
the centers could work with made most of their networks even more diffused and required 
developing new types of capabilities and interactions. Some of these activities have been branded 
“development less directly related to research” (Alston Dehmer and Pardey 2006, pp. 324). It 
should be noted, though, that this statement reflects a mode 1 research; if properly conducted, 
these activities could involve action-research methods and fall into the mode 2 type. 
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After realizing the potential of high value agriculture to eliminate poverty, several centers 
started to work on diversification and development of niche markets to the point that high value 
agriculture has become one of the CGIAR’s priorities (CGIAR 2005). This type of work, 
however, differs greatly from that done on staples and livestock. Because high value markets are 
more complex, newer and fast changing, development of the business model is, at least, as 
important as the agronomic package (Reardon 2005). When their mandate committed them to 
work in low value products (e.g., maize or rice), some centers explored the use of their crops as 
inputs in the production of high value products. But the CGIAR centers did not have the 
expertise to develop agricultural value chains. Over time, a few centers (e.g., CIP and CIAT) 
developed some of these capabilities, but, then, they became more similar to some NGOs and 
increasingly different from traditional research centers. This does not mean that these activities 
should not be done, but it is not clear what advantage the CGIAR has in this area relative to 
specialized NGOs (e.g., Technoserve) or universities with strong international programs such as 
MSU or Wageningen. 
The main challenge agricultural research in the CGIAR now faces is that the networks it 
formed in the past are no longer viable because most NARIs have weakened, and the new 
partnerships that need to be created require new models of science, new partners and new 
patterns of interaction. However, because of the complexity of innovation processes and the 
rapid changes science is going thorough, there are no clear guidelines for how to build these 
partnerships. Complexity theories and the innovations systems framework can provide guidance 
on how to approach the problem (see below and section 7). 
Social science (including economics) always played a subordinate role in the system. 
Initially, these programs were created to study the factors that determined farmers’ adoption of 
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improved varieties (Cernea 2006). When funding declined in the late 1980s, the priority shifted 
to measuring the centers’ impact to justify their work to the donors. In recent years, several 
centers have started programs to analyze the nature of agricultural innovations, but these efforts 
are dispersed and have not reached critical mass (e.g., CIP, IFPRI and ILRI). In addition, 
learning how to promote innovation among small farmers requires new research routines (Ekboir 
et al. 2008), and few centers have developed expertise in them. 
The CGIAR’s two specialized social sciences centers (ISNAR and IFPRI) require special 
consideration. ISNAR was mandated with helping NARS; when these were downsized, donors 
started to question their support to a center meant to work with institutions that were neglected 
by their own governments. Recognizing the new environment, ISNAR started to explore the 
concept of innovation systems; this new direction, however, was strongly criticized by the 
Technical Advisory Committee and the External Program and Management Review, and 
contributed to its closure (ISNAR 2002).6  
This criticism, however, reflected the linear vision of science, and a lack of understanding 
of the emerging needs of innovation networks in developing countries. While the NARS 
weakened, the importance of other actors in the innovation system increased (see sections 2 and 
3). These actors, the international centers and the CGIAR included, also needed support to 
strengthen their capabilities to manage innovation processes and to develop instruments 
appropriate for the new economic and social environment, in particular innovation policies. Most 
organizations, however, have great difficulties in developing new capabilities on their own 
(Christensen and Raynor 2003; Smit 2007). To overcome these hurdles, the specialized literature 
                                               
6 It must be also recognized that serious management problems contributed to ISNAR’s closure (ISNAR  2002). 
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recommends creating bridging structures that help organizations find useful information, mediate 
between researchers and other areas of the network and identify internal and external barriers to 
innovation (Davila, Epstein and Shelton 2006). ISNAR was starting to work along these lines 
when it was closed.  
Recently, some donors (e.g., DFID and CIRAD) and centers (e.g., Bioversity) started to 
explore programs to develop innovation capabilities (see, for example, DFID’s Research into 
Use program and Bioversity’s ILAC initiative), but these efforts are isolated. Because of its large 
and diverse international network, the CGIAR could play a bridging role in innovation networks, 
and help NARIs to adapt to the new vision of science (see below). 
IFPRI was created to research food policies and provide policy advice. From its 
beginnings, it developed a culture that valued publications in scholarly journals above more 
applied work and interactions with policymakers in developing countries. Because many 
contained policy lessons applicable to several countries, these studies were branded as 
international public goods, but they are no different from many papers published by researchers 
from other international organizations, think tanks or universities. For most of its life, IFPRI 
established weak links with other CGIAR centers and policymakers in developing countries and 
could have been a department in a good university. While in recent years IFPRI has introduced 
new programs with input from social sciences other than economics, the center still has an 
academic culture that does not fit into the new paradigms of science (see section 4).  
Additionally, IFPRI’s culture resulted in an extremely narrow exploration of policy 
alternatives, overreliance on a restricted theoretical body (i.e., essentially microeconomic theory 
and quantitative methods) and, sometimes, policy advice of dubious quality. For example, its 
research policy recommendations have not evolved in the last twenty years (see, for example, 
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Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006), and are based on the linear vision of science, and mechanistic 
models (e.g., DREAM and ASTI). In other cases, the policy recommendations are based on 
uncorroborated assumptions without checking their validity. For example, Ruben and Pender 
(2004) assert the existence of diminishing returns to investments in research. The empirical 
evidence on diminishing returns, however, is far from conclusive. Diminishing returns are 
assumed in static microeconomic models in order to derive an analytical solution; quantitative 
analyses that do not find decreasing returns are generally considered flawed and discarded. In 
dynamic, complex models, however, there is no reason to assume diminishing returns. Because 
the interaction between positive and negative feedback loops is continuous and changing, returns 
can alternatively be increasing and decreasing. In short, decreasing returns are the result of the 
assumptions used and not necessarily happen in reality. Although IFPRI broadened the scope of 
its research in recent years, it is still dominated by a culture that does not value interaction with 
non-academic stakeholders and experimentation of new research methods. This culture partially 
explains the failure of the ISNAR division.7  
In 2003 the CGIAR launched the first Challenge program; a new approach to building 
partnerships that could have major implications for the system. These programs provide a 
flexible mechanism to structure multidisciplinary, inter-institutional teams to address specific 
issues. If properly managed, they provide the basis for conducting mode 2 research (see section 
4).  
Two reviews by the Science Council and the CGIAR Secretariat (Science Council 2007 
and 2004), however, indicate that the CGIAR still evaluates the Challenge Programs from the 
                                               
7 Serious management mistakes also contributed to the failure. 
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narrow perspective of the linear vision of science. The rationale for the Challenge programs 
should not be the generation of international public goods (in other words, information), but the 
exploration of new institutional arrangements through which formal research can contribute to 
poverty alleviation, and to build innovative capabilities in developing countries. These 
instruments should not necessarily include the international centers, or could be outside their 
areas of expertise. The CGIAR, however, can use its international scope to manage and supervise 
these programs and to transform them into effective learning mechanisms. Several donors 
already fund some activities of this kind, for example, DFID’s Research into Use program, but 
they remain isolated activities.  
In 2004 the Science Council was given more power to oversee the work of the centers, 
especially, setting the system’s priorities (CGIAR 2005). Since then it has been trying to align 
the centers’ activities with these priorities. Such alignment can have serious consequences. As 
was explained in section 3.1, complex processes are difficult to understand and predict. 
Therefore, instead of setting clearly defined strategies and priorities, actors operating in such 
environments should use strategies for identifying emerging trends and exploring alternative 
solutions. Fifteen independent but coordinated centers can be a very effective structure to 
implement a strategy of decentralized experimentation with centralized learning. In fact, most 
centers have already implemented innovative projects in response to identified opportunities; 
what the system lacks is an effective and flexible structure to learn from these projects. The 
Science Council could become the basis of such structure and help to identify new research 
needs, opportunities and methods where the CGIAR can make a contribution.  
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An additional problem is that the model of research behind the priorities set by the Science 
Council still reflects a linear vision of science (see Science Council 2005). Forcing the centers to 
revert to such model would isolate them even more from innovation networks. 
6. What role should the CGIAR play in poverty alleviation? 
The new dynamics of rural poverty and the better understanding of science and of its role 
in development have two major implications for the CGIAR. First, the CGIAR has been justified 
as a source of international public goods (Alston at al. 2006; Science Council 2005). The public 
good the CGIAR produces is scientific information, either embedded in seeds or disembodied as 
papers and recommendations.8 As was explained in section 3.3, however, the contribution of 
scientific and other information to innovation (and poverty alleviation) depends on the 
innovators’ absorptive capabilities, including their ability to access and use information 
generated in distant locations. Therefore, the system’s impact depends, among other factors, on 
the quality of its research, the relevance of the information to innovators and their ability to use 
it. In other words, the CGIAR must adapt its current activities to interact more effectively with 
researchers and with other actors in innovation networks. The communication must be two-way. 
Researchers need to understand the innovators’ needs and the dynamics of poverty, and the 
innovators need to be able to find and use useful scientific information. The weakening of public 
research systems in developing countries and the increasing importance of the private sector and 
civil society organizations in developing countries are adding urgency to the establishment of 
these links. But this work is less “upstream” research as required by the Science Council and 
                                               
8 The CGIAR also conducts other activities that are not public goods. 
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more “development”, and requires a redefinition of the CGIAR activities, in particular, of its 
social scientists (see below). 
Second, the CGIAR’s contribution to poverty alleviation depends on the creation of 
effective learning routines to explore more effective interventions to foster innovation. Such 
learning routines must be developed both by the innovation networks and the CGIAR itself. 
Because of its global presence, the CGIAR can help to identify successful experiences in many 
countries, link innovators with sources of scientific and technical information (including 
advanced research institutions) in distant locations and use action-research to help adapt foreign 
experiences to local conditions. In this way, the CGIAR would become the central node of a 
system of decentralized experimentation with centralized learning. An example of such work 
was the development of a no-till planter for small farmers involving actors in Bolivia and India, 
process in which CIMMYT played a key role (Ekboir 2002).  
The exploration should also include the traditional breeding networks, but including new 
partners. Sixty years ago, these networks were centered in the CGIAR, and included public and 
private breeding programs, seed companies and extension services. Today, the public actors in 
developing countries have seriously weakened, leaving the CGIAR without its main partners. 
While new partnerships are emerging, the CGIAR should explore more actively additional 
arrangements to better support the diffusion of improved seeds.  
Similarly, the CGIAR should use its decentralized structure to adapt faster to emerging 
needs and opportunities. Such adaptation requires experimentation and flexibility, but the 
CGIAR is not currently a learning organization. With its current vision of science and 
organization, the system is too rigid and atomized to learn from the activities of the individual 
centers.  To become more nimble, the CGIAR should: 
Paper presented in the VI Globelics Conference, September 22-24 2008, Mexico City 
25 
 
 Realize that innovation is a complex process that depends on the emergence of networks with 
different types of partners; even more, the networks’ composition and governance must 
respond to the unique needs of each process. The CGIAR can catalyze the emergence of such 
networks. In fact, this is already being done in the Challenge programs but these should be 
expanded and given more flexibility as was explained in section 5. Such changes run 
contrary to the recommendations issued by the CGIAR secretariat and the Science Council 
(Science Council 2007 and 2004).  
 Recognize that unforeseen problems and opportunities will emerge. Rigid priority setting 
would miss these emerging issues and reduce the system’s impact. Additionally, individual 
institutions (including the CGIAR centers) cannot change fast enough to address emergent 
issues, but a diversified, large global system can (Kramer 2006). In other words, the CGIAR 
should tap more into good researchers from a wide range of institutions that manage 
programs that may not involve staples. The key for such strategy is to have a strong 
executive office to identify the problems, identify actors (including researchers) that can 
develop solutions and allocate the resources. Such strategy would require strengthening the 
Science Council and changing its function from overseeing the centers to fostering learning 
through experimentation.  
 Reevaluate the role of social research in the CGIAR. Many centers do not have a critical 
mass of social scientists; even more, the number of scientists has been falling and they were 
never fully integrated into the centers core activities (Cerenea 2006). In addition, it is not 
clear what IFPRI is doing that could not be done by universities with strong international 
programs. Other centers have been more innovative in searching for new paths to foster 
innovation, but again, it is not clear what advantage they have over specialized organizations 
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like PROLINNOVA or KIT at the Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam. As was mentioned 
in section 5, these organizations do not have effective learning routines, which opens a niche 
for the CGIAR. Social scientists from all centers could strengthen their collaborations to 
achieve critical mass for the creation of a learning structure to explore new ways to a) foster 
the emergence of innovation networks that involve ARIs and developing countries teams and 
identify the roles the international centers should play in them, b) promote institutional 
change in their centers, c) help the centers’ researchers from other disciplines to develop new 
research modes that facilitate interactions with other actors; and d) given the failure of 
traditional training programs to build lasting capabilities in the public sector, build the 
capabilities of other actors in innovation systems. IFPRI’s ISNAR division could have been 
the core of such “virtual” social sciences center, but currently lacks the capabilities and 
incentives to do it. 
 Better understand the joint dynamics of agricultural production, globalization and migration 
to redefine the CGIAR’s role in poverty alleviation. In particular, it should explore the 
different pathways poor rural households can follow to escape poverty, what capabilities 
these households need to follow the different paths and what instruments can be implemented 
to build these capabilities. It should also explore the role traditional research (including 
breeding) should play in these processes. 
7. Final remarks  
The dynamics of development and poverty are rapidly changing due to globalization, 
migration and technical change. In the last two decades, many poor rural households have 
diversified their livelihood strategies, seeking more off-farm income and high value agriculture 
at the expense of low value products. Most of the technologies used in high value agriculture 
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were developed by private firms and distributed by the private sector or NGOs; public research 
institutions and extension had very limited participation in the most dynamic markets. 
Additionally, several studies have found that growth is the most effective way to reduce poverty, 
which questions the strategy of supporting low value agriculture by small farmers as a 
development instrument.  
These facts are starting to change the perception of the effectiveness of traditional 
development policies, including the role agricultural research should play in poverty alleviation. 
In particular, the concept of innovation is replacing the traditional research and extension 
continuum. Innovations are developed by networks that include private firms, farmers, technical 
advisers and, in some cases, researchers; in fact, most innovations do not originate in formal 
research but in productive or social processes. The networks’ ability to innovate depends, among 
other factors, on their absorptive capabilities, i.e., their ability to search for and use existing 
information, whether it is scientific, commercial or organizational. 
The innovation systems framework questions the traditional role assigned to the CGIAR, 
i.e., the production of international public goods. The information generated by the international 
research centers can only be used by those actors that have invested to build their absorptive 
capabilities. In other words, while the information is free, its use is not. This observation helps to 
explain the limited expansion of agriculture in poor households despite the fact that many of 
them receive remittances from migrants.  
The CGIAR defines itself not just as a technical but rather as a development research 
institution (Cernea 2006). To fulfill this vision, the system will have to adapt to the new 
environment, facilitating the interaction between global research and local innovation networks, 
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and helping innovation networks to access technical information and to create it when it is 
lacking, in other words, strengthening its role as a bridging agent.  
It will also have to add flexibility to its centers, so that they can explore new instruments to 
foster innovation. This will require a redesign of the Science Council so that instead of an organ 
of control it becomes a key agent in a learning structure. 
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